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Legitimacy and Activities of Civil Society Organizations 
ABSTRACT 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play an active and noteworthy role in governance, 
both at the national and international level. Three questions arise: First, how do CSOs 
exercise their advocacy, what repertoires, strategies and resources do they use? Second, 
to what degree are they legitimized to do so? Third, are there systematic differences 
between member and non-member CSOs, respectively between policy fields? Based on 
a survey of 60 exemplary CSOs covering four distinct international-level policy making 
fora, we will inquire into these questions. The central finding is that membership CSOs 
neither differ substantially from non-member CSOs in their roles and strategies of deal-
ing with International Organizations, nor do they differ in other aspects of legitimacy, 
such as transparency or inclusion of beneficiaries. There are no systematic patterns in 
CSOs properties or behavior which correspond to policy fields.  
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Legitimacy and Activities of Civil Society Organizations 
1. THE ROLE OF CSOS IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THEIR 
NEED FOR LEGITIMACY  
As international governance and international-level decision-making increases in impact 
and scope, the legitimizing link between citizens and the institutions factually doing the 
governing gets stretched, and, as some would argue, overstretched; cf. Scholte (2004). 
Originally, the argument was that international-level decision-making is legitimated by 
the electoral link: At the international level, governments are faithful agents of their 
voters and held accountable for what they do, just as at the national level. As interna-
tional-level decision-making requires consensus, governments - and thereby the voters - 
may at the very least opt out. This view came under critique for several reasons. First, 
the perceived lack of democratic legitimation became obvious as IOs, in particular the 
EU, underwent a secular shift away from decision-making modes in which elected gov-
ernments had both the final say and the possibility to opt out, to decision-making 
modes, in which unelected actors, either from the IO's staff or determined by the IO, 
have a substantial say on policy decisions which immediately affect citizens and which 
do no longer grant an exit option to governments. Practically it is also next to impossi-
ble for states to leave IOs, let alone the EU, which implies that a legitimation of the IO 
by the argument that states have the choice to leave but chose to stay is not valid, cf. 
Agné (2007). So, while it was formerly credible to construct a link of accountability and 
democratic legitimation between citizens and the policies imposed on them, it became 
increasingly possible that citizens of a country were subjected to policies opposed by a 
majority in the country. 
Second, the governments' role as faithful agents was questioned. In particular the 
public choice perspective on international governance, cf. Vaubel (1986), convincingly 
argues that there are systematic differences regarding preferences of citizens on the one 
hand, and of international-level bureaucracies and politicians on the other. The more the 
political class and international agencies get isolated from citizens, the more the ac-
countability for policy outputs and the actual outcomes can be blurred; cf. Steffek 
(2010) and the greater the risk that the bureaucratic-political complex will drift away 
from the preferences of the citizens. International-level negotiations are seen by public 
choice theorists as the prototypical setting in which agents - both, political and bureau-
cratic - can impose their preferences on the governed while hiding their responsibility. 
The hazard of an isolated, unobserved, unaccountable and unresponsive political elite at 
the international level has likewise been identified by authors from other traditions of 
democratic theory; cf. Follesdal/Hix (2005); Vibert (2007) and Gustavsson et al. (2009). 
The lack of accountability, is, as Kahler (2005) argues, “more likely the result of 
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choices by the most influential national governments than a symptom of the dysfunc-
tions of international bureaucracies”, Kahler (2005: 17). As the relevance of interna-
tional-level politics increased and more decision-making powers migrated to the IOs 
themselves, more attention was paid to political and academic circles to the problem of 
a potential democratic and legitimacy deficit; cf. Halpin/McLaverty (2010: 55-57) for a 
very concise summary of this problem. As a reaction to this real or perceived democ-
ratic deficit, several major IOs have actively engaged in involving citizens in the deci-
sion-making by a range of participatory mechanisms; Brown/Fox (2001), Alger (2002), 
Greenwood (2007) and Steffek/Nanz (2008). Notably the growing role and influence of 
organized Civil Society, is a result of, on the one hand, IOs seeking not only informa-
tion from the ground but also seeking to increase their legitimation by involving "repre-
sentatives" of the citizenry, cf. Greenwood (2004), Dingwerth (2007) and Saurugger 
(2008). In addition, more Civil Society Organizations, henceforth CSOs, came into exis-
tence and they are more actively striving for influence on policy-making by IOs, and to 
some degree, they factually exercise influence; cf. Arts (1998), Martens (2005: 45-94) 
and Dür (2008); not least, because the international level is a setting where groups 
which are disadvantaged at the national level may be able to achieve more; cf. Pollack 
(1997). 
1.1. CSOs as Transmission Belts in International Governance 
CSOs may fulfill a number of functions which are often summarized under the term 
“transmission belt”; cf. Steffek/Nanz (2008). Of the many activities, we will, in this 
paper, focus on information provision respectively transmission, and on the advocacy 
activities. In terms of advocacy and interest intermediation, extensive research on CSO 
activity has illustrated how CSOs advocate certain policies or norms, what resources 
and strategies they can use, Bouwen (2004) and Beyers (2004), in what roles they exert 
vis-à-vis IOs in various settings, ranging from economic issues treated in the WTO 
(Steffek/Ehling 2008) to legal ones, treated in the International Criminal Court (Glasius 
2008), in institutionalized settings, cf. Martens (2005), or negotiations, cf. Brühl (2010). 
In terms of information transmission, CSOs can create a link between citizens and 
IOs. Acting as a supplement to the media, CSOs are also seen as a contributor to an in-
formed public discourse by informing members and the general public about what is 
going on at the international level; cf. Beyers (2004) and Altides (2011). Here, CSOs 
have the advantage over the media, that they are more knowledgeable and thus able to 
“translate” a policy into real life effects, and are tracking the IO more continual and 
more closely than the media. By informing their members and the wider public, CSOs 
contribute to creating accountability; cf. critical Kohler-Koch (2010aWEP). But their 
role consists also of creating a link by engaging in communication, in particular in two-
way communication. 
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1.2. CSOs and Legitimacy of International Governance 
Even assuming that involvement of CSOs can increase legitimacy of International Gov-
ernance, the focus is shifted on the CSOs themselves: how legitimate are they? As it is, 
citizen involvement is predominantly indirect, via CSOs.1 As Steffek et al. (2010a) put 
it, the idea is that CSO involvement in international governance reduces the democratic 
deficit and increases both the legitimacy of the IO and its outputs, because "CSOs are 
somehow able to embody, represent, or reflect citizens’ interests, anxieties, hopes and 
ideals."; Steffek et al. (2010a: 101). The increase in legitimacy of international politics 
by including CSOs is critically dependent on the legitimacy of the CSOs themselves. To 
contribute to IO legitimacy, the CSOs should represent those on whose behalf the CSO 
is active, who are concerned by themes the IO is currently working on, often referred to 
as beneficiaries. While the will of the population as a whole gets represented by elected 
governments, CSOs may stand in as a supplement representing those citizens who are 
(or feel) particularly concerned by the issue, are unable to organize, or are not part of 
the government’s constituency, i.e. living somewhere else in the unenviable state of 
being affected by, but not represented in the international level governance process. The 
presumption is that CSOs add an additional layer of representation to international gov-
ernance, beyond representation through member governments, by speaking for minori-
ties, latent groups, but also the "general interest" or norms, that get somehow lost in the 
conventional political process.2 
So, how about the legitimacy of CSOs? Some authors, and also the IOs, seem to per-
ceive CSOs as legitimate qua existence or because they are not pursing the typical inter-
ests of a conventional business lobbying group. Notably, Goodin (2003) argues that 
CSOs are first of all voluntary associations and are not exercising any form of power 
over their members. Thus they are not in need of  direct legitimation through “democ-
ratic” procedures, such as elections. Moreover, CSOs are in their activities controlled by 
the mechanism of reputation and the control of others, individuals and CSOs, in their 
peer group. Most of all, the implicit argument often is that CSOs are good, charitable, 
striving to do good, and therefore do not need additional sources of legitimacy. Critics, 
such as Anderson (2000) and Johns (2003), explicitly reject the notion that CSOs factu-
ally increase the legitimacy of IO decision-making, but see CSOs as actors without de-
                                                 
1  Exemptions are for instance the EU's online consultations, which are open to all, the same goes for conference 
attendance by EU initiated conferences, see Quittkat (2011).  
2  The quite obvious problem in this presumption is, why transnational CSOs should be more successful at articulat-
ing and transmitting preferences than existing forms of interest intermediation, notably political parties. In par-
ticular as CSOs are subject to the very same problems of professionalization and elite-building as are political 
parties; cf. Saurugger (2009). 
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mocratic legitimation and control, but nevertheless willing and to some degree able to 
impose their views on society at large, claiming that they are speaking for it but lacking 
any actual linkage with it; see also Collingwood/Logister (2005) for critical discussion 
of the CSOs roles and activities. 
In our view, the requirement for an explicit legitimation of even the most public-
spirited CSO can be derived from the function that they are assigned in a system of in-
ternational public governance. If they are to serve as links to global citizenry, as concep-
tualized by democratic theorists and IOs alike, CSOs need to be legitimate in the sense 
of being representative of a discernable societal constituency. They should hence repre-
sent citizens, in particular those who find it difficult to articulate their interests, and they 
should not be a free floating entity, whose origins, financing and supporters remain ob-
scure. Moreover, there is evidence that CSOs do play an active and measurable (or at 
least noticeable) role in international governance; cf. Arts (1998), Warleigh (2000), 
Martens (2005) or Hahn (2010). As they affect the making of authoritative decisions 
and hence the lives and wellbeing of many, the question of legitimacy becomes even 
more urgent. 
1.3. Open Questions and Structure of the Paper  
While there are many studies on roles, functions, strategies and usage of resources of 
CSOs in international governance, the question of CSO legitimacy is under-researched. 
Notably studies on patterns between legitimacy and the other functions of CSOs are 
missing. As it is, there are few comparative empirical studies on the legitimacy, proper-
ties and activities of transnational CSOs, e.g. Bozzini (2007) as a case in point. But 
there is evidence from other levels that legitimacy of the CSO matters for their influ-
ence, but also for their behavior. For the EU, there is a wide range of theoretical and 
empirical work indicating that CSO’ legitimacy, notably their representativity, matters 
for their influence. The EU itself is in need of input legitimacy and the idea is that this 
can be achieved by involving legitimate and representative CSOs gives CSOs with these 
properties an advantage, cf. Greenwood (2004) and Bouwen (2002). 
For transnational CSOs, there is little empirical information about legitimacy to be-
gin with, and this paper shall contribute to filling this gap. While there is no elaborate 
theory of why certain CSOs engage in assuring legitimacy, we can derive some predic-
tions, in particular based on the policy field where the CSO is active, making use of the 
“policy determines politics” framework. After outlining how properties of policy fields 
might affect CSO legitimacy, legitimacy will be conceptualized and operationalized. 
The paper's empirical sections will compare sixty heterogeneous CSOs regarding pat-
terns in their legitimation styles and also regarding their overall level of legitimation. 
We will also test for systematic patterns in legitimacy in accordance with the predic-
tions made. Using quantitative and qualitative data, we will present information on what 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 156) 
- 5 - 
resources and what strategies are in use, and discuss the roles that the CSOs surveyed 
fulfill in relation to IOs, their relationship with citizens, their functions and inner work-
ings, with a particular regard to whether there are systematic patterns in how CSOs with 
certain properties behave and act. The ultimate goal is to identify certain properties of 
CSOs that have a positive impact on the legitimacy of the organization, conceived of as 
their capacity to link with citizens. In the next section we discuss those organizational 
characteristics that are the most plausible candidates. 
2. FACTORS FOR CSO LEGITIMACY AND ACTIVITIES 
What hypotheses can be made about the relationship between CSOs' theme, as regards 
their properties on the one hand and on the other hand, their legitimacy and their activi-
ties in terms of how they interact with IOs, members, and the public? In this study, we 
recur to the information about the CSO's constitutive theme and its member structure, 
and formulate hypotheses, derived from the existing literature on the politics of interest 
intermediation, cf. Wilson (1980) and Permanand/Mossialos (2005) in a “policy deter-
mines politics” framework. Broadly speaking, we start from the policy field, see mem-
bership structures as an intervening variable, and will compare how CSOs with certain 
member structures and activity in certain policy fields differ in legitimacy and their ac-
tivities. 
2.1. Policy Field 
The present study covers the policy fields of Trade, Human Rights and Peace, and Envi-
ronmental policy. Properties of these policy fields might affect the organizational struc-
ture and activities of CSOs. For instance, policy fields differ in whether there are clear 
cleavages between conflicting interests, for instance in the domain of environmental 
protection, or whether there is no "opposition", as in the case of peace and human rights. 
Similar, issue areas differ in that in some cases, transnational CSOs are offsprings of 
pre-existing national-level interests organizations mainly organized in a hierarchical 
way. For instance, in economic issues such as trade, there are national-level business 
associations and trade unions with a long history and substantial resources. For these 
issues we would expect that connections between transnational CSOs and members 
(mainly national member organizations) are better developed. 
Trade is an issue where citizens are immediately concerned, as employees and con-
sumers, and where, with Trade Unions and Business Associations, one has a set of re-
sourceful and well established CSOs right from the start. The original set of CSOs was 
later complemented by CSOs acting on behalf of others, i.e. third world countries, 
which are involved but are perceived by some as being disadvantaged in world trade. 
Trade is per se a mixed-motive game at the level of the world and at the level of the 
country. But it is also a theme where redistributive implications of certain policies are 
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quite clear, and while the overall effect of trade may be beneficial for all, there are also 
clear cases of winners and losers. 
Environmental policy is the typical case of a collective action problem, typically 
lacking material benefits which might incentivize actors to engage, resulting in a strong 
role for political entrepreneurs mobilizing support for the issue. On the other hand, costs 
of environmental protection are easily visible and those bearing the costs of implement-
ing environmental protection are typically also those groups of actors who are already 
well-organized and resourceful at the national level, viz. the industry, in changing coali-
tions with other actors, like trade unions. It is also the theme where one is ultimately not 
active on behalf of someone but on behalf of something, viz. nature, plants and animals. 
This fact may dispense with the need for inclusion efforts, because the effect of policies 
on these beneficiaries can be evaluated from a distance. Finally, at the international 
level it is also a theme with substantial differences in preferences between industrialized 
and developing countries: in developing countries, economic development ranks higher 
than environmental protection, and first-world CSOs advocating high environmental 
standards may be compromising the economic interests of third-world citizens. 
Human Rights and Peace as policy fields share the feature that the counterpart is not 
another societal group as in environmental protection, but typically governments: rogue 
governments violating human rights or peace, but also governments of first-world coun-
tries, which, in the perception of activists, do not do enough to make rogue governments 
mend their ways. At the same time, societal actors have a strong role in implementing 
decisions made at the international level, for instance in post-conflict-peace building 
efforts. Another characteristic of these themes is that, while one can (still) legitimately 
have a different preference regarding the trade-off between economic development and 
environmental protection, one can hardly be opposed to peace or to the protection of 
human rights. Human rights and peace is a policy sector where CSOs often are active on 
behalf of others, namely people in developing countries, who have difficulties to be 
present at the IO where their fate is discussed. We would assume, that the necessity for 
inclusion is even higher here than in the fields of environment and trade. 
2.2. Member structure 
At first glance it seems that CSOs with a broad membership base should be particularly 
good at establishing a link with their societal constituency. Having members is a re-
source and also a factor which impacts on the CSO's internal workings. Members are an 
element of legitimacy, in that a member-CSO can claim to speak for its members, or at 
least to represent the attitudes of its members (who may or may not be identical to the 
beneficiaries). CSO legitimacy here is based on input from its members. Being a think 
tank with excellent connections to the ground, a high reputation and moreover with no 
obvious ideological program, such as International Alert, gives its policy papers and its 
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statements a better standing in consultations and itself a better access to policy-makers 
in need of crucial and unbiased information. Legitimacy of the CSO is here derived 
from its output. 
Members are also both a resource and a handicap in dealing with an IO. If a CSO 
does not have members, its opportunities to stage a public campaign including public 
protests and street demonstrations are limited, which may affect the CSO’s strategies. 
Having members and assigning a strong role to them can also be a liability: active 
members represent a more engaged group, likely to demand more extreme positions and 
less willing to compromise than the CSO's central office - all of which makes a strongly 
member-driven CSOs a difficult partner in complex negotiations; see Saurugger (2008) 
and Kohler-Koch/Buth (2011). 
Further, we would expect a large gap between consultancies and think-tanks on the 
one hand, and member organizations on the other, regarding the involvement of the ul-
timate beneficiaries of the CSO's efforts. It can be argued, that consultancy-style CSOs 
are more in need to connect with the beneficiaries, because they lack other links into 
society. Lacking representation on a democratic or membership basis, they derive their 
legitimacy from being the "voice" of the beneficiaries; cf. Halpin/McLaverty (2010) and 
Risse (2006). But to do so with at least some credibility, they need some form of institu-
tionalized connection with the beneficiaries. 
Regarding the type of members, we would expect that member involvement is 
stronger in the case of organizations as members compared to individual members, be-
cause the collective good problem of steering and controlling the CSO, is less strong in 
the case of organizations of organizations. To summarize, we expect the membership of 
CSOs to affect activities of CSOs by influencing resources and constraints arising from 
a certain membership structure. As for efforts to include the ultimate beneficiaries, one 
could, again based on normative considerations, state that CSOs without members 
should be more engaged in inclusion efforts. 
2.3. General Considerations of Good Governance 
Finally, irrespective of member structure and policy field, transparency, as one of the 
major themes in the wake of the good governance discussion, should, from a normative 
point of view, be present in all CSOs alike; cf. Bovens (2007) and Grigorescu (2007). 
While there is no obvious mechanism linking the CSO's theme and its transparency, one 
might presume that if there are individual members, they might urge the CSO's admini-
stration for more transparency, in that they want to be kept informed about what "their" 
CSO is doing. 
Lacking truly exogenous variables and a survey of the total CSO population, we are 
restrained to the presentation and analysis of patterns: What is the level of CSO legiti-
macy? Are there patterns among various elements of legitimacy? Are there patterns in 
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CSO activity which relate to legitimacy? In particular, do CSOs with different member 
structures differ in their activities? Are there patterns in the sense that CSOs in a certain 
policy field are more similar to each other? 
3. LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMACY MEASUREMENT 
Conceptually, this paper's notion of legitimacy is based on the normative framework of 
CSOs as transmission belts in international-level governance; cf. Steffek/Nanz (2008) 
and Steffek et al. (2010a). CSOs connect the international-level at the top, where deci-
sions are made by IOs and governments, and citizens at the bottom end of the decision-
making hierarchy. In terms of decision-making, the transmission-belt concept also sees 
CSOs as a crucial source of information which can increase the quality of the policy, 
delivering relevant input (in terms of alternative policy solutions, evaluation of past 
decisions, but also in terms of agenda setting). In terms of legitimation, the transmission 
belt concept perceives CSOs as a supplement to conventional legitimation channels 
running from citizens as voters via national parties and elections to national parliaments 
and further on to governments and ultimately to IOs, where national governments de-
cide on a consensual basis about international policies with national-level impact. 
How can legitimation, which is the most crucial point in our comparison of CSOs, be 
measured in a more quantitative way? Our starting point is the normative idea that 
CSOs should be involved in international policy-making in order to increase the legiti-
macy of decision-making. CSOs function as a "transmission belt" in this setting, linking 
citizens with the international level; Nanz/Steffek (2008). CSOs as a "transmission belt" 
connect two levels, IOs and citizens. Given that a CSO is involved in international-level 
decision-making, surrounded primarily by other delegates and other CSOs, the risk is 
that it might slip into a patronizing role, in which the CSO "knows better" what is good 
for its members than the members themselves. For the CSO to be legitimate, it should 
be strongly connected with citizens, ideally through membership, who should be in-
volved in the CSOs working. 
Based on a reflection on the institutional requirements to fulfill this role, Steffek et 
al. (2010a) elaborated five interdependent criteria by which CSO legitimacy can be as-
sured. These criteria - and the selection of empirical indicators in the later sections - 
explicitly share the normatively derived view of how CSOs should be connected with 
citizens and how CSOs should behave vis-à-vis citizens, beneficiaries, and the IOs.3 The 
                                                 
3  An alternative view would rely less on the input legitimation, and more on output legitimation. This implies that 
governance takes more the form of a technocracy, which uses social technology to achieve uncontested aims and 
which is evaluated by its outputs. To achieve optimal outputs, the only requirement is technical expertise. The cri-
terion to evaluate the role of CSOs in this frame would be, whether they are formally qualified and factually de-
liver reliable information enabling the technocracy to make the optimal decisions. There are some settings, in 
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criteria also address problems to which all organizations are prone, for instance of be-
coming self-referential. We apply the criteria and indicators universally to all CSOs. We 
emphasize that a CSO with no members is not fundamentally different from CSOs that 
have members as it may still engage in the same activities, the same efforts to include 
the ultimate beneficiaries, but in its advocacy efforts it is lacking the legitimation and 
the resources arising from membership. 
3.1. Participation 
Participation encompasses at least three aspects: Who participates, how and in which 
domains? 1) Do members participate? Do the ultimate beneficiaries have a role? (cf. the 
next point) Are they asked whether they agree with the efforts of the CSO, for instance 
in the case of a CSO engaging in helping a certain group of persons (a first-world CSO 
acting on behalf of citizens of third-world countries)? 2) How do these actors partici-
pate, are they involved in a way which is binding for the CSO, or are they only con-
sulted on a loose and non-binding basis, which leaves a great leeway for the CSO and 
its Advocacy Office, henceforth AdO, to pursue the policy they deem right? 3) And in 
what domains do they participate, also in executing the decision of the CSO (imple-
menting projects, conducting public demonstrations to "advocate" a policy) or in the 
process of deciding what issues to pursue and what stance to take? Also in reference to 
the empirical analysis in the latter sections, we draw a distinction in the CSO population 
between CSOs which have members and those which do not. For the latter, we will use 
the term consultancy CSO. 
3.2.  Inclusion 
The IOs perceive CSOs as representatives of groups who are not represented via "con-
ventional" channels. They include CSOs in order to increase their legitimacy by expos-
ing themselves to a larger variety of arguments and views held among citizens. It is thus 
crucial that, if possible, all views are present at the IO level. Unfortunately, some views 
are held by social groups with low chances of articulating them, by getting organized in 
form of a CSO and to be present at the IO; cf. Piewitt (2010) for the biased composition 
of CSOs active at the WTO. CSOs derive their legitimacy also from the argument that 
they represent and are active on behalf of a group of citizens or by representing groups 
which are, for some reason or other, unable to speak for themselves. These can be latent 
groups, minorities, but also citizens of other countries (the poor in developing countries, 
or victims of human rights abuse in other countries). However, CSOs are confronted 
                                                                                                                                               
which this seems to be the case. i.e. where there are universally accepted aims and outputs, which immediately 
indicate the achievement of these aims. In this view, the only "CSOs" would be think-tanks, and the evaluation 
criteria would not be representation but scientific expertise.  
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with the same problems that IOs face: some groups in any policy domain are systemati-
cally less likely to be present in the CSO, and less likely to engage with a CSO than 
others. Thus, arguments and views held by these groups are less likely to be present in 
the CSO; cf. Schlozman (1984).  
Another danger to legitimacy arises from the fact that transnational CSOs are still 
largely a first-world phenomenon, and first-world preferences may diverge systemati-
cally from preferences of beneficiaries in developing countries. CSOs - constituted of 
well-educated first-world citizens, wealthy enough to engage pro bono in political ac-
tion on behalf of others - are at risk of slipping in a patronizing role, believing that they 
know better what is good for the beneficiaries than the beneficiaries themselves; cf. Eas-
terly (2007). The trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection is a 
case in point. Thus, supplementary to engaging with members, explicit efforts at inclu-
sion are a criterion for legitimacy. It is insufficient to be there and willing to react, to be 
inclusive, it is necessary to actively reach out. Specifically, the question is: do CSOs 
actively engage in getting the opinion of beneficiaries who themselves are neither able 
to come to the IO nor to the CSO and state their view? 
3.3. Transparency 
Transparency in the domain of CSOs concerns standards of good governance, such as 
the handling of financial issues, but in particular the internal working of the CSOs. As 
both Bovens (2007) and Grigorescu (2007) argue, transparency is an essential element 
of good governance, regardless of the body doing the governance. Legitimacy requires 
transparency, notably that it is clear who actually made a decision, in order to hold the 
person or institution accountable for the outcomes. The same holds true for CSOs: a 
CSO should be transparent in what it does, what is decided on and how it was decided 
on by whom. In the course of their activities, CSOs make a lot of substantive decisions 
and the members respectively the beneficiaries should be aware of what the substance 
of these decisions is, who made them and in what way. 
More concrete, transparency entails access to information about the CSO's internal 
policy-/decision-making process: Is it clear how a certain policy-decision is made, by 
whom, and is it clear, what the decision actually is? For instance, CSOs typically pre-
sent their position to IOs in the form of policy papers, which advocate certain actions 
and decisions. Transparency here concerns whether it is clear to members or the public, 
what positions the CSO actually suggests. Transparency also concerns, whether it is 
clear, to members and the public, who in the CSO decided on certain issues, for in-
stance, whether to keep these demands up or whether to pursue this campaign? Last but 
not least, CSOs should be transparent regarding where the funding is coming from, and 
how it is spent. 
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3.4. Independence 
From the transmission-belt perspective of increasing democratic legitimacy by increas-
ing representation and plurality, CSOs are a means of civil society, of citizens, to influ-
ence international-level governance by circumventing and supplementing conventional 
pathways of political representation. Thus, CSOs should be created and steered by citi-
zens, and be independent from the addressee, i.e. from the IO they are tracking. CSOs 
should exist because citizens want them to exist. To be authentic, the flow of arguments 
and preferences should be bottom-up, and the behavior of CSOs should be uncon-
strained by influence of the addressed political institutions, such as the EU or IOs. 
However, this is not automatically the case. Notably the EU itself has engaged in the 
process of creating European-level CSOs, in some instance "created" their member-
ships, for instance by expanding into countries where CSOs working on a certain issue 
did not exist; Greenwood (2007: 344/5). This is the participatory process turned upside 
down. It is difficult to measure independence in terms of substantive content and actual 
behavior, and the survey underlying this study does not contain systematic information 
on this aspect. Nevertheless, independence can be conceptualized as complementary to 
member control: the more members factually control the CSO, the less it is dependent 
on the IO. 
3.5. Aim: Responsive and Legitimate CSOs 
Ultimately, the purpose of CSO involvement is to increase IO legitimacy and to assure 
that IOs are responsive to civil society. For this to be the case, the CSOs involved must 
be legitimate and responsive. One may evaluate the IO and the CSO regarding its re-
sponsiveness; cf. Steffek et al. (2010a) for the twofold view of responsiveness. In both 
views, responsiveness concerns whether the IO's - respectively the CSO's - activities 
and policies actually reflect the interests and preferences of its constituency in a mean-
ingful way. For instance, are policy demands stated by the CSO in the context of an IO 
really in line with what CSO's members or the beneficiaries want and express as their 
preference? In terms of causality, the abovementioned four features are seen by Steffek 
et al. (2010a) as the preconditions for responsiveness of CSOs, and ultimately also for 
the responsiveness of IOs. Evaluating responsiveness of CSOs would require informa-
tion on what CSOs do, which would have to be compared with independently obtained 
information on what beneficiaries and constituency would like it to do, which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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4. A QUANTITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CSO LEGITIMACY 
AND ACTIVITIES 
4.1. Case Selection: Themes, IOs and CSOs 
The sample of CSOs that we used is no random sample of CSOs, but aims to include 
typical cases which sample the population of CSOs in an exemplary way. The popula-
tion of CSOs can be stratified in different "ecosystems" covering themes and IOs active 
in these themes. Thus, the sampling is nested: CSOs and IOs within certain issue areas. 
We chose four of the most prominent themes of today's international governance: Trade, 
Environment, Peace, and Human Rights. Each is covered by a wide range of IOs, differ-
ing in their scope but also in their competence to issue binding policies for a certain 
theme. The policy field of trade was covered by two IOs / fora: the WTO and EU Exter-
nal trade policy. The policy field of environmental protection was covered by EU Envi-
ronmental Policy and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
For human rights, three fora were chosen, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 
the Internet Governance Forum, and EU Migration policy. Last, for peace, the conglom-
erate of institutions in the frame of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
was selected. In the paper, we chose the notion "forum", as we not only refer to the for-
mal institutions like a Directorate General, but refer to the whole ecosystem constituted 
of formal institutions and the CSOs orbiting around them. 
CSOs come in different types, and the sample tried to get at least some cases for 
each. There are classic member-CSOs, where only individuals are members, e.g. Am-
nesty International; there are organizations of organizations, e.g. EU Associations con-
stituted of national-level members like the EU Trade Union Congress; hybrid organiza-
tions with both individuals and organizations as members, and CSOs without any mem-
bers, for which we use the label consultancies. Some of the latter are based on a founda-
tion combined with an initial donation, others are operating in a mode similar to com-
mercial consultancies, albeit with a clientèle consisting of IOs and governments. 
While not a statistically representative survey, the CSOs sampled are those men-
tioned by practitioners as being among the most influential and important ones in the 
themes under consideration. Thus, our findings cover a significant "part of the action" in 
the CSO population. As with other specialist surveys, the sampling was subject to avail-
ability of a contact person. Thus, while we cannot say anything descriptive about the 
entire universe of transnational CSOs or about the properties determining that a CSO is 
important or not, we can say something about the degree to which CSOs fulfill criteria 
of legitimation, what patterns exist between legitimacy and activities, and whether the 
most dominant CSOs in a certain theme share some distinct features. Based on the hy-
potheses outlined above, we can make descriptive statements about whether the obser-
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vations by and large confirm the expectations, and about what organizational features 
go together. Table 1 gives the basic descriptives for the composition of the sample. 
Table 1: Composition of the Sample - Theme, IO Affiliation and Membership Structure 
IO Affiliation Themes Membership Structure 
ESDP 9 Environment 9 No members 14 
EU Environment 4 Human Rights 16 Individuals 11 
EU External Trade 8 Peace 9 Organizations 29 
EU Migration 8 Trade 26 Both ("hybrid") 6 
IGF 3     
UNFCCC 5     
UNHCR 5     
WTO 18     
 
Interviewees and CSOs were recruited as follows: The CSOs have a constitutive theme, 
where they were originally active, but often are active in a range of related fields. The 
CSOs sampled for this study are all covering IOs related to their constitutive theme. The 
CSO is present in the IO with an Advocacy Office, AdO, in charge of advocating the 
CSO's agenda in this setting and in covering the IO, i.e. to monitor the IO’s activities for 
new policies and developments. The interviewees were recruited from the AdOs, and 
questioned regarding their own activities and regarding the activities of the CSO. The 
data was gathered using semi-structured interviews with representatives from the CSOs' 
advocacy offices within three institutional frameworks, the WTO, the EU and the UN, 
during autumn 2007 to summer 2008; see Steffek et al. (2010b) for additional documen-
tation. The survey underlying this study had two foci:  
(1) How CSOs perceive themselves in relation to the IO, how they can influence 
the policy-making by the IO, be it institutional (setting rules) or operational 
(actually doing something, like engaging in help for a developing country or in 
response to a natural disaster), and what resources and strategies they have at 
hand to influence the IO. 
(2) How CSOs see themselves in relation to citizens and the beneficiaries of their 
activities, what roles do these have in the CSO, how do CSOs transfer input 
from citizens to the IO and how do they transport information and outputs 
from the IO to citizens. 
4.2. Legitimation Patterns among CSOs 
The empirical analysis proceeds as follows: After deriving empirical indicators opera-
tionalizing the transmission-belt concept of legitimacy enumerated in Steffek et al. 
(2010a), we present levels of legitimation and similarities among the CSOs. The core of 
the presentation is the clustering of the CSOs based on information about the CSOs as 
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obtained from interviews and the Internet. Empirical indicators are constrained by avail-
ability of information. The available documentation varies among CSOs. If a CSO men-
tions that it is a contractor for projects launched by an IO, or that it is predominantly 
financed by industry contributions, this may indicate dependency. But the absence of 
such information does not indicate independence. It does however indicate a lack of 
transparency, if the CSO makes no information available as to where the funding is 
coming from. For this reason, we used only information that can be interpreted in terms 
of the underlying concepts used. 
4.2.1. Participation  
Participation per se is wider than participation of members in CSO' s internal decision-
making as it concerns a range of activities and functions. Involvement of disempowered 
groups and beneficiaries will be covered in the next section. The participation of sup-
porters and donors who are not formal members of the CSO was not systematically 
covered in the survey. Indicators for the criterion of participation are the following:  
(1) CSOs should have members to be legitimate, they should not be "free float-
ing". Members can be either organizations, individuals or both; the variable 
Member indicates the absence or presence of members of either type. Once 
again we emphasize that a CSO which is funding itself by some means or oth-
er and has no members is not something genuinely different but is a CSO 
which is not legitimized by membership.4 
(2) CSOs should involve members in decision-making on the content of its policy, 
of the political aims it pursues. This concerns the strategic and the tactical lev-
el of decision-making, i.e. determining long term aims of the CSO and how 
these aims are pursued. In principle, members can be involved in any stage. 
We covered whether the strategic- and the tactical decision-making involves 
members by either conducting member conferences or member surveys, in 
which members are invited to make a clear statement as to what the CSO shall 
do in the coming periods. This variable we call MemberInfluence.  
(3) Participation can also involve members into the CSO's core functions and op-
erating, apart from direct involvement in decision-making on policy questions. 
Examples of such functions are: to provide public services for the CSO or for 
the IO, to provide ad-hoc policy input (information, demands, ideas for policy 
alternatives etc.), to plan and implement projects with the CSO, to engage in 
                                                 
4  Such a "consultancy" CSO can still generate some legitimacy by being transparent - and by its conduct, e.g. by 
limiting its work on supplying unbiased information. Whether consultancy CSOs and member CSOs differ in 
other aspects of legitimacy is an empirical question. 
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fund-raising and respectively direct funding by members and finally, to evalu-
ate what the CSO does, be it its advocacy work or the evaluation of projects 
conducted by the CSO. The presence or absence of these types of involving 
members in the CSOs work were combined to the variable MemberRoleIndex. 
4.2.2. Transparency 
A CSO should be transparent in what it does, advocates, about how it makes its deci-
sions and also about the content of its decisions. It should be clear where the funding is 
coming from and where it goes to. As empirical indicators we included (1) transparency 
about the CSOs inner policy-making process and (2) transparency about its funding.   
(1) Organizational transparency concerns, whether the substantive positions of the 
CSO are documented by way of position papers and conference reports, e.g. 
summarizing what a member conference decided. Is it clear what the CSO did, 
e.g. by publishing an annual report on its activities? As for the internal work-
ings, transparency implies that it is clear how the CSO arrives at a decision. Is 
something like the "constitution" online, which makes clear what the decision-
making procedures within the CSO are, how the various Committees and 
Boards are determined and how substantive policy-decisions are made in the 
CSO? This information was combined into an index of organizational trans-
parency.  
(2) Financial transparency concerns whether the sources of financing (government 
grants, grants from the IO, private donations etc.), the overall size of the budg-
et, and its usage (projects, fund-raising activities, salaries etc.) are publicly ac-
cessible. These items of information were combined into an index of financial 
transparency.   
The requirement of publishing all information on the Internet might seem to be a high 
hurdle but these days the Internet is the platform to present oneself to the public. Given 
that many of the CSOs claim to speak not only for their members but for larger groups 
of citizens or the public in general, they should also be open towards these non-
members.  
In addition, we created an ExternalControl Index, which covers whether the CSO 
subjects itself to some form of external control in terms of "good governance". We 
chose whether the CSO gets a financial audit on a regular basis and whether it abides to 
an external code of conduct. As an illustration, Germanwatch abides to a general stan-
dard agreed on by all German CSOs, is also registered in the EU Lobby register and 
abides by the EU's "Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives". 
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4.2.3. Independence 
The CSO should be independent from governments and the IO they are covering in their 
advocacy work, but also from the market. Non-profit status is widely seen as one consti-
tutive criterion for the third sector and the crucial feature distinguishing the "norms 
based" CSOs from their "commercial" lobbyist counterpart. This independence con-
cerns in particular the funding, which may come in the form of grants, project funding 
and donations. Alas, the information available on the Internet about the sources of fund-
ing, in particular on funding from IOs, is very sparse. Some CSOs state their funding 
sources in detail, listing the amounts received from governments, IOs, or industry, and 
also whether these funds come earmarked, i.e. have to be used for certain projects or are 
a remuneration for some service. Unfortunately, others list nothing at all in this regard, 
making it impossible to measure independence using funding, as one does not know 
whether those who do not report anything do not have anything to report or just keep 
silent about this issue. The same is true for the issue of whether the CSO is executing 
projects on behalf of IOs, for governments, or for industry, or is in some contractual 
relationship with either. This information is usable to evaluate the transparency, but not 
for evaluating the independence, which can, for this reason, not be included in the fol-
lowing empirical analysis. 
4.2.4. Inclusion Efforts 
Inclusion efforts - including specifically those interests and groups which are affected 
and are most likely to be "forgotten" - are seen as a necessary criterion for legitimacy. 
Transnational CSOs are, after all is said and done, an upper class, Schattschneider 
(1960) and Maloney (2007), and first world phenomenon; cf. Piewitt (2010), notably as 
far as the level of activity is concerned. In particular, there is the perceived risk that 
CSOs systematically ignore preferences held by the ultimate beneficiaries, oftentimes 
people living in poverty and under oppression.  
To avoid this "patronizing" or "avantgardistic" role, the CSO must reconnect with the 
beneficiaries, if possible. In terms of concrete action, CSOs need to go out and ask the 
people "on the ground" for their opinion, and whether they are in favor or opposing the 
CSOs' policy proposal and the ideas stated by the CSO. During the interviews, two 
practices came up to assure that disempowered groups are present in the CSO: first, 
giving grants, usually travel grants, so that certain persons can attend meetings and con-
ferences; second, quota rules stating that board or staff members must be from certain 
groups.5 As the occurrence of such efforts is quite rare, we coded the InclusionEfforts 
variable binary, in terms of yes or no. 
                                                 
5  Some first-world CSOs engaged in non-gender-specific themes counted quota for women as an inclusion effort to 
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Table 2 gives the underlying pattern of the indicators of legitimacy among the sixty 
CSOs as obtained by a factor analysis combining the variables enumerated above. Vari-
ables loading on the same latent factor indicate that the manifest features go together. 
Table 2: Patterns of Legitimacy among CSOs 
Variable Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
Member 0,738 -0,266 
MemberInfluence 0,516 -0,344 
MemberRoleIndex 0,682 -0,080 
TransparencyOrganizational 0,567 0,229 
TransparencyFinancial 0,249 0,426 
ExternalControl 0,335 0,580 
InclusionEfforts 0,049 -0,049 
Eigenvalue  1,773 0,768 
Remark: N=60. Unrotated factor scores 
The solution obtained, in particular the low values of the factor loadings, indicates that 
while there is some pattern, the manifest legitimation criteria (inclusion efforts, trans-
parency, external control and the like) are to a substantial degree independent of each 
other. It is not the case that if a certain CSO is highly legitimate in one aspect, it is also 
highly legitimate in all (the) other aspects. Instead, a CSO might be highly legitimate in 
one aspect and have low legitimacy in another. One might hypothesize as we did in sec-
tion 2, that if citizens are involved, they would insist on abidance to other criteria of 
legitimacy, like transparency or inclusion, but this is not the case. 
Participation constitutes one dimension - little surprising, if there are members, they 
will have both a role in the CSOs activities and they will have some control over the 
CSO. However, in particular the latter causal connection is rather weak, a consequence 
of the fact that many CSOs which have members, nevertheless assign little say to mem-
bers about what the CSO does in terms of activities and policy decisions. As the sample 
is by no means meant to be representative for the CSO population, we can not make a 
statement about the relative frequency of non-member and member CSOs in the popula-
tion of all CSOs. 
Transparency, it turns out, is no single dimension: the aspect of organizational trans-
parency - how decisions are made - and the "good governance" aspect of transparency - 
being open about financing and having a financial audit - are independent. Having 
members and giving them a role (variables Member and MemberInfluence and Mem-
berRoleIndex) makes a CSO slightly more transparent in terms of how decisions are 
made (TransparencyOrganizational), typically by describing the role of member confer-
ences, but it does not actually make the CSO more transparent in terms of its financial 
                                                                                                                                               
empower disenfranchised groups albeit their beneficiaries were not women. 
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affairs (variables TransparencyFinancial and ExternalControl). Even if there are mem-
bers, they seemingly do not insist on more transparency. Still, consultancy CSOs, for 
which transparency would be - from a normative point of view - more important, are 
typically less transparent in financial and organizational terms compared to member 
CSOs. 
Last, if one looks at all CSOs, regardless of whether they have members or not, the 
existence of members does not make the CSO more engaged in active efforts to include 
disempowered groups (variable InclusionEfforts). Only 17 of the 60 CSO engage ac-
tively in such efforts, but those 17 are highly heterogeneous in all other aspects. Irre-
spective of the membership type, 27 to 33 percent of the CSOs with a certain type of 
membership engage in inclusion efforts.6 It is neither the case that the members of a 
CSO insist on including disempowered groups, nor is it the case that consultancy CSOs, 
for which in the absence of members inclusion efforts are one of the few ways to con-
nect with people, take more care to include the groups (and their views) which are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their work. If one takes only the 46 CSOs which have members 
(individuals, organizations, or both) the picture differs somewhat, see table 3. 
Table 3: Patterns in Legitimacy among Member CSOs 
Variable  Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
MemberInfluence -0,025 0,417 
MemberRoleIndex 0,289 0,022 
TransparencyOrganizational 0,554 0,158 
TransparencyFinancial 0,479 -0,175 
ExternalControl 0,728 -0,029 
InclusionEfforts 0,059 0,363 
Eigenvalue 1,153 0,362 
Remark: N=46. Unrotated factor scores 
Among the 46 member CSOs, there is no stringent pattern of how members participate: 
that members have encompassing roles in the work of the CSOs (such as participating 
in implementing projects, variable MemberRoleIndex) does not mean that they also 
have substantial influence on what the CSOs does (are e.g. involved in setting the stra-
tegic aims of the CSO’s work, variable MemberInfluence), and vice versa.  
Among member CSOs, there is a tendency that those who give more influence to 
their members are also the ones which engage more in inclusion efforts, indicating that 
the CSO's efforts to connect with beneficiaries are somewhat higher, but the relationship 
is weak.  
                                                 
6  The rate is lowest - 27% - among CSOs which have only individual members, and highest - 33% - among CSOs 
which have both individuals and organizations as members.  
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The relationship is stronger between the different aspects of transparency: if a mem-
ber CSO fulfills one aspect of transparency, it is more likely that it also fulfills others. 
But that is not caused by the roles and the influence of members. It is not the case that 
CSOs which have members are more transparent than free floating ones, nor is it the 
case that CSOs in which members have a stronger role and more influence are more 
transparent. 
The analysis confirms that the role of members is just one aspect of the CSO's char-
acteristics, which has very limited effects on other aspects of its legitimacy and behav-
ior. The main message is that it is clearly not the case that various aspects of legitimacy 
go together, let alone reinforce each other. One might argue that having a direct connec-
tion with citizens (having members, giving them a role) is an essential element in le-
gitimacy. Not so. Having members is no decisive component, which assures that other 
criteria of legitimacy are met. This finding is confirmed in the qualitative information 
obtained in the open sections of the interview, where interviewees indicated that they 
are clearly comfortable with a very limited role of members, whose function is to pro-
vide funding. 
Supplementing the institutional sources of legitimacy, we asked: How, to whom and 
about what do the CSOs perceive themselves to be accountable? During the interviews, 
the respondents were given a list of things and groups and were asked whether they feel 
accountable to one or more items. Table 4 gives the results, again differentiated for 
member and non-member CSOs. 
Table 4: Perceived Accountability among CSO Officials 
Whom do you feel accountable to?  
 All CSOs Non-Member CSOs Member CSOs 
Members 65%  82,61% 
Beneficiaries 32% 50% 26,09% 
Donors 33% 42,90% 30,44% 
the Public 12% 14,30% 10,87% 
Norms 5% 0% 6,52% 
Colleagues; other CSOs 12% 28,60% 6,52% 
 N=60 N=14 N=46 
 
If the CSO has members, it is highly likely that the respondent feels ( also ) accountable 
to them. For both, member and non-member CSOs, the accountability to donors is high. 
The most notable difference is that non-member CSOs (Consultancies) feel twice as 
often also accountable to the ultimate beneficiaries of their efforts, while an astonishing 
three quarters of the member CSOs feel no such accountability. As will be shown later, 
this accountability to beneficiaries is not reflected in differences in a CSO's inclusion 
efforts. In addition, the peer group effect of seeing oneself in reference to other CSOs 
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working in the same issue or colleagues is much higher among the consultancy-type 
CSOs. As for the question, of whether the CSOs also have the general public in mind, 
the evidence is to the contrary: norms and the general public (which included future 
generations) do not feature among the entities they feel accountable to. 
4.2.5. Members, CSOs and Advocacy Offices 
One can conceptualize the link between citizens and the CSOs' specific efforts as a 
chain of delegation: a fraction of all members meet in a General Assembly to elect (or 
acclaim) a Central Board, and ideally also determine an overall agenda for the CSO. 
Decision-making on substantive questions needs to be differentiated: Strategic ques-
tions, i.e. the long-term aims, are decided by the Central Board and the members, if 
there are any, usually by a General Assembly, meeting in some case once a year, in oth-
ers every three or four years, or by member surveys. But the actual work is done by staff 
in the AdOs, under varying degrees of control through the Central Board. Here, there is 
a substantial role for organizational features like the CSO's scope and size, but also for 
idiosyncratic features like the personal style of the Director, or the fact whether the AdO 
covering an IO is directly located at the Central Office or in another location. For their 
daily work, interviewees reported different settings: some interviewees reported to have 
substantial leeway in what they do, communicating informally with other staff mem-
bers, with other CSOs, but also with some selected and engaged members, which one 
interviewee called the "external team". Tactical decision-making on how to implement 
strategies, on how to pursue a certain aim, how to conduct a lobbying campaign, is typi-
cally left to AdOs and the individual in charge, who has substantial leeway in running 
the day-to-day business. 
4.3. Patterns in CSO Roles, Activities and Resources 
Following the transmission belt concept, CSOs ideally perform several functions, 
among them interest mediation and advocacy addressing the IO, but also the transmis-
sion of information from the relatively closed circles of International Governance to 
members and the broader public. Do CSOs differ in their roles, activities and resources 
they have at hand to influence the IO? And if so, do organizational features explain 
these differences? 
4.3.1. Behavior of CSOs vis-à-vis the Citizens: Modes and Direction of 
Communication 
As stated above, CSO can potentially serve the function of creating a link between IOs 
and citizens, by engaging in communication, in particular in two-way communication:  
First, CSOs can send information to members but also to citizens, ideally enabling 
them to form an opinion about the IO and the themes it covers, which in turn is the pre-
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condition for a broader "informed public". On the other hand, the information given by 
a CSO to its members or presented to the public (for instance on its website) is hardly 
unbiased information, but, after a closer look, turns out to mix factual information with 
"political messages", to define a certain problem in accordance with the CSO's view of 
the world and ideological orientation, in order to favor some conclusions over others; cf. 
Collingwood/Logister (2005) for the problem of the CSO's credibility gap.  
Second, communication can serve to receive input from the members, supplementing 
the "official" occasions, when members are asked to submit their views, via periodical 
votes, surveys and elections. As for instance Eising (2008) argues and Altides (2011) 
finds, there is a trade-off between engaging in two-way communication and the chance 
to influence IOs. Crudely put, informing the public or members about everything that is 
going on is an obstacle to be seen as a trustworthy and discreet negotiation partner by 
the IO, which is a requirement for exercising influence (Steffek/Ferretti, 2009). And, 
actually listening to members may result in being forced to advocate a position which is 
both too extreme and inflexible to be of relevance. The question we want to look at here 
is: Are CSOs more busy to inform members, or are they equally busy to get the original, 
unadulterated preferences of members, a precondition for keeping their own activities in 
line with the preferences of their members? As these are different aspects of communi-
cation, several variables were generated. The variable Informing covers whether the 
interviewee, when being in communication with members, is giving them information 
about the issues, solutions etc. s/he is currently working on. The opposite direction is 
covered by the variable Receiving, capturing whether the interviewee is also engaged in 
receiving information from members when formulating policies and deciding on tactics. 
Both were combined to a variable InformationTransmission, which captures whether the 
flow of information goes both ways. 
Table 5: Communication Patterns with Members 
RECEIVING 
information from members 
 
No Yes Total 
No 2 7 9 (20%) 
Yes  8 29 37 (80%) 
INFORMING 
members 
Total 10 (22%) 36 (22%) 46 
Remark: CSOs with members only. Correlation = 0.0058 
A third motive for communicating with members is mobilizing them for supporting the 
CSO and the AdO. Specifically, these efforts consist of convincing members that the IO 
is important for the aims of the CSO, to create policy-support for the CSO's position or 
to mobilize members, for instance to engage in national-level advocacy efforts, which 
were combined to the 0 to 3 variable Mobilizing. The variables refer to both the AdO 
and the CSO. 
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There are 14 CSOs which do not have any members - neither individuals nor organ-
izational members - and can thus not communicate with members (see the section on 
informing the general public below). The communication pattern among member CSOs 
shows, interestingly, no correlation between whether AdOs engage in informing mem-
bers and are receiving information from members. That a CSO has members does by no 
means imply that the AdO - where the actual advocacy work is done - is in any way 
connected with them. Still, there might be intermediate connections via the CSO's main 
policy-making body. 
Among those 46 CSOs in the sample that have members, there are ten, i.e. about one 
in five, where the AdO did not report to engage in any communication with the aim of 
receiving any form of direct input from members: ATTAC, ENAR, Germanwatch, 
IHEU, IOE, ITUC, PICUM, QUNO, UN Watch and the German subsidiary of the 
WWF. If these AdO communicate, they do so only for the purpose of informing and 
motivating their members, i.e. of influencing member's preferences. It is reasonable to 
presume that the sending of information (sending the newsletter etc.) is done by the 
main office of the CSOs, and that the AdO is more or less isolated from a direct connec-
tion with citizens. 
Table 6: CSOs as Information Transmitter and Mobilizer 
CSO is MOBILIZING members  
(convincing, creating policy support, mobilizing members) 
 
 
0 1 2 3 Total 
No  6 7 4 0 17 
Yes 6 4 10 9 29 
Information 
Transmission 
Total 12 11 14 9 46 
Remark: CSOs with members only. Correlation: 0.39* 
If one defines the role of a CSO as an enabler and facilitator of public discourse, in that 
the CSOs is both informing citizens about the policy issues it is tracking and receiving 
the information and input from citizens, only 29 of the 60 CSOs surveyed are living up 
to this role. If the CSO has members it is about twice as likely that the CSOs is a two-
way information transmitter, but still, it is by no way certain, because 17 of the 46 
member CSOs are no "transmitters". Of the 46 CSOs with members, the majority of 34 
is also engaged in mobilizing its members, 11 are engaged in mobilizing only, without 
taking up input from members. 
CSOs can, irrespective of their member structure, contribute to informing the public 
discourse by publishing reports and policy analysis and activity reports which not only 
inform about what they did but what happened in that fraction of the international level 
they are covering. Findings in the literature, cf. Altides (2011) for a recent comparative 
study, indicate that even this one-way flow of information is basically under-developed, 
and presumably for strategic reasons. How is the situation in our sample? Table 7 dis-
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 156) 
- 23 - 
plays the share of CSOs that are publishing newsletters, position papers and activity 
reports available to the general public. 
Table 7: Providing Information to the General Public 
All CSO Member CSOs Consultancies  
 % yes % yes % yes 
Newsletter 53,3 69,6 0 
Position Papers 66,7 76,1 35,7 
Activity Reports 68,3 69,6 64,3 
N 60 46 14 
 
Here too, the possibilities of the Internet as a platform to inform citizens are not used to 
the fullest extent possible. In our sample, newsletters, while not per se confined to this 
function, are a feature of member CSOs, and thus predominantly used to address mem-
bers. Member CSOs are more open about what positions they take in the debate, Policy 
Papers, but both, member CSOs and consultancy CSOs are equally open about what 
they are doing, Activity Reports (cum grano salis, as the actual content of the activity 
reports was not investigated). 
What can we say about the receiving end of the CSOs' communication efforts? Stud-
ies like Altides (2011) and Tresch/Fischer (2008) indicate that the role of CSOs in pub-
licizing EU politics and also the resonance of CSOs in national media is low, albeit with 
substantial national level variation. While we cannot engage in something similar to 
Altides' content analysis, we investigated the media presence of the sixty CSOs, using 
the number of mentionings for the three year period 2007 to 2009 in the LexisNexis 
Press database.7 
Given the different nature of CSOs, media presence may result from different me-
chanisms, serve different functions and can be interpreted in different ways:  
(1) Media presence might result from efforts by the CSOs, as a part of their strat-
egy, notably the strategy to incite public awareness and protest by pushing a 
certain theme. CSOs which recur to public protests might have a higher media 
presence in that they are the object of media reports.  
(2) It might result from CSOs fulfilling their role of transmitting information to 
the broader public sphere, with CSOs reaching out to the media, passing on in-
                                                 
7  Accessed via http://rzblx10.uni-regensburg.de/dbinfo/detail.php?bib_id=tuda&colors=&ocolors=&lett=f&titel_id 
=1670 [accessed during September 2010]. The LexisNexis database covers on a full text basis, among other 
things, a broad range of periodicals: newspapers like The Independent, the New York Times, El Pais and maga-
zines, like Germany's Der Spiegel. While not covering all media, it covers a substantial share of European and in-
ternational print media. 
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formation the media might be interested in and raising issues. CSOs are then 
mentioned as a barking watchdog. 
(3) It might also be the result of the media initiating contact with CSOs in order to 
obtain some piece of information required for a contribution, and the CSO is 
then mentioned in exchange for information and as an indication of a source.  
Absent a detailed content analysis of the reports, the multitude of mechanisms by which 
media presence may come about makes it difficult to attribute it to one mechanism. 
However, given the profile of the CSOs, we might, with some certainty, interpret media 
presence as a result of certain activities rather than others. 
Analyzing the media presence of CSOs yields some interesting findings, even when 
considering that these findings are to some degree time specific, depending on current 
events and fads. The average of media mentionings for the 60 CSO during the three 
years under consideration is 1544, i.e. on average, each CSO was mentioned in 1544 
media reports. The variation is substantial, with some CSOs being never mentioned, for 
instance the Austrian migration CSO Asylkoordination, and some CSOs being men-
tioned very often, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, with average numbers of mentionings of 26189, 26153 and 17040 mentionings, 
respectively. Among them, these three CSOs constitute 74% of all mentionings in the 
database, a clear indication that very few CSOs disproportionately dominate the public 
perception of CSO activities. Media presence is also distributed to varying degrees 
among the CSOs active in an issue area. In some issue area, e.g. Environment and Hu-
man Rights, a few flagship CSOs dominate (Greenpeace and Amnesty), in other fields, 
such as trade, the distribution of media presence is more even. 
There are substantial differences in media presence by issue area. For the three years 
under consideration, Human Rights was the most present theme in the media, giving 
CSOs tracking this theme (and covering the relevant IOs, EU Migration and the 
UNHCR) a substantially higher media attention than others (on average 2823 mention-
ings). 
The main activities and properties of CSOs, in particular the degree to which they re-
cur to the public and public pressure as a resource in their efforts, affects their media 
presence. CSOs using threat potential and public protests as a resource for their advo-
cacy have a much higher media presence than CSOs which do not resort to such con-
frontational strategies, indicating that threat potential arises predominantly from threat-
ening with negative publicity in the media, rather than sanctioning the IO by withhold-
ing critical information and ending cooperation in projects.  
As for the membership aspect, the most media-present CSOs are individual-member 
CSOs (on average 4928 hits) and the consultancy CSOs (on average 1635 hits, with the 
International Crisis Group leading the field with 3523 hits). As consultancies do not 
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have any members, they achieve their media presence presumably via their ability to 
provide the media with essential and valid information. Member CSOs might be men-
tioned so often, because many readers are aware of their existence. Organizations of 
organizations or hybrid organizations are rarely mentioned in the media.  
Handing out press releases in the course of the day-to-day work per se does not cre-
ate media presence, indicating that a CSO needs additional characteristics to be of inter-
est for the media. Still, CSOs transmitting information are mentioned more than twice 
as often in the media than CSOs that do not transmit information according to our defi-
nition (2267 vs. 867 hits).  
CSOs in a more cooperative relationship with the IO (for instance because they are 
cooperating with the IO in joint projects) are less present in the media than CSOs which 
perceive their role as being also a counterpart to the IO. CSO which see themselves as a 
counterpart to the IO are slightly more often mentioned in the media than those who do 
not see their task as being among other things to be a corrective for the IO. 
Taken together, the media presence confirms to some degree that there are two dis-
junct strategies, loosely corresponding to the insider-outsider-model of interest interme-
diation; Grant (1978) and Broscheid/Coen (2003). One can cooperate with the IO, 
which leads to a different set of activities, or one can be more confrontative, for which 
media presence and access to the public are the most important resources. 
4.3.2. Behavior of CSOs vis-à-vis IO 
The behavior of CSOs vis-à-vis the IOs they are covering is characterized by the roles 
the CSOs pursue, the resources they have at hand, and the activities they engage in. 
4.3.2.1. Roles of CSOs vis-à-vis the IO 
The interviewees were asked which roles they pursue in context of the IO. Specifically, 
we asked, whether they engage in one or several of the following four roles:  
(1) "Counterpart of the IO the CSO is targeting". The IO has a certain agenda, and 
the CSOs may try to influence this agenda, either by bringing new issues on 
the table (for instance social aspects of trade negotiations) or it may explicitly 
try to counter the IO's mission, i.e. raise objections and give arguments, why 
the IO should abstain from certain activities. 
(2) "Partner of the IO in conducting projects". Some IOs are conducting projects, 
for instance, dispensing developing aid, or capacity building, and here the 
CSOs may also act as a partner in conducting and implementing projects "on 
the ground". This may have the form of a contractual relationship on in more 
informal ways. 
(3) "Provider of Information for the IO". Just as national-level regulators, IOs are 
in need of reliable and valid information, in particular on what the problem is, 
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what options there are, and what the likely effects of a certain solution will be 
for what groups. The IO also needs information on what is happening, and 
some CSOs can specialize in creating and running the networks on the ground, 
for instance in a country rife with civil unrest or civil war, to monitor devel-
opments and to warn the IO about impending conflicts. 
(4) "Counterweight" - No CSO is alone in the field and in most issues there are 
several opposing opinions, embodied in CSOs. Little surprising, one role of a 
CSO is to counterweight advocacy efforts of other actors, which may be other 
CSOs or states. This "counterweight" situation characterizes issues with clear 
distributive effects, for instance where industry and labor interests clash. But 
"counter-weighting" also occurs on issues which have no clear cut material 
distributive dimension. For instance, in the issue of conflict prevention and 
human rights, some CSOs report that they are a counterweight to states in the 
IO, which are not willing to act in a certain way, for instance which are not 
willing to engage in humanitarian aid. 
4.3.2.2. Resources of CSOs when Engaging with IOs 
The CSOs differ in what resources they have at hand. These resources may originate 
from properties of the CSO (members, access to the media and the public) or they can 
result from an exchange, for instance the capability to execute tasks for the IO, which is 
reciprocated in some way or other. The CSOs where asked which of the following re-
sources they can command to make the IO listen to them:  
(1) Providing Information - the CSO can be a crucial provider of information, ex-
erting influence by giving the "right" information or by exchanging informa-
tion against influence. 
(2) Moral Arguments - the CSOs can recur to their moral authority and the moral 
quality of their arguments as a influential resource in pushing for certain poli-
cies. 
(3) Representation – the CSOs can claim to speak for a substantial share of the 
population, not necessarily in their role as political citizens but for instance in 
their role as employees or employers.  
(4) Service Provision - CSOs can provide services for the IO, be it by way of for-
mal subcontracting or in less formal ways, such as monitoring developments. 
(5) Direct Links - CSOs can have close and personal links to persons who make or 
influence the decisions, and can recur to this as a valuable resource. 
(6) Threat Potential – CSOs, notably the well-organized and multinational CSOs, 
can make use of their “brand name”, the connection to the public, as a mean to 
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engage in public actions via the national level or in naming and shaming ef-
forts. 
4.3.2.3. Activities of the CSOs Targeting the IO 
Regarding what the CSOs do in their daily activities, i.e. how they operate when they 
are advocating their position, there are a several typical activities CSOs engage in when 
dealing with the IO they are tracking:  
(1) they can engage in Public Protest, in whatever form 
(2) they can issue Press Releases as a part of creating both public pressure and to 
influence the public opinion  
(3) they can submit Policy Papers in response to invitations or on their own initia-
tive 
(4) they can recur to the classic technique of Direct Relations and Lobbying of 
those persons who are in charge of the decision-making  
(5) and they can participate in formal Consultations launched by the IO, in which 
they present their views and positions in verbal or written form.  
By way of simplification, patterns in resources, activities and roles were combined to 
three additive indices: 
The index CSORoles summarizes the multitude of roles the CSO can fulfill in the 
setting of the IO: it may be a counterpart to the IO itself raising concerns overlooked by 
the IO and its governmental members; it may be a partner in the IO's projects, a pro-
vider of information required by the IO; or it may be a counterweight to other CSOs 
present in the setting of the IO. 
The index variable CSOInstruments summarizes the instruments, which the CSO typ-
ically engages in: to launch public protests; to issue press releases or policy papers; to 
engage in "classical" lobbying by using direct; personal relations or to participate in 
consultations launched by the IO. 
Last, the CSOResources index covers the different resources on which the CSO relies 
when influencing the IO: providing information, presenting moral arguments, being 
representative for a large share of the population, provide services to the IO, having 
direct personal links or having a substantial threat potential, typically by creating nega-
tive publicity. 
In the analysis, these indices were supplemented by the information about whether 
the CSO engages in a proactive role. While all CSOs react to invitations to participate, 
deliver opinions to themes set by the IO, and the like, some are actively engaged in get-
ting access and in bringing things to the agenda. While there is no information about the 
success of such activities, it is an important element of the self concept of the CSO. 
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Table 8: CSOs in Relation to IOs 
Variable  Dimension 1 Dimension 2 
CSORoles 0,336 -0,180 
CSOInstruments 0,646 -0,003 
CSOResources 0,654 0,014 
ProActiveRole 0,264 0,201 
Eigenvalue 1,03 0,07 
Remark: N=60. Unrotated Factor scores 
Exploring the patterns in roles, activities and resources of the CSOs vis-à-vis the IO as 
given in table 8 shows that there is substantial independent variation in the four proper-
ties used to describe the CSOs:  
There is no correlation between the level of available resources and whether the 
CSOs is also proactive or only reacting to the IO (waiting for invitations, taking a stance 
to themes raised by the IO). While most CSOs - 47 of 60 - also are proactive, the more 
passive 13 ones do neither act that way because of a lack of resources, nor because they 
pursue a different set of roles.  
There is a significant positive correlation between the resources and instruments in 
that the CSOs with more and different resources at hand also use more instruments, i.e. 
different activities to influence the IO. This is what one would expect, because for a 
certain activity, certain resources are strictly required and the availability of certain re-
sources allows a CSO to engage in a certain activity. For instance, engaging in "classi-
cal" lobbying as an activity requires that there are direct and personal connections to 
decision makers.  
On the other hand, there is no noteworthy correlation between either resources or in-
struments and the multitude of roles the CSO engages in. It is not the case that more 
resourceful CSOs also see themselves as performing more roles. Rather, they pursue 
their roles with more instruments and more resources, i.e. maybe with higher success. 
4.4. Properties and Activities of CSOs: An Overall Picture 
In order to summarizes the overall pattern of legitimacy and activity of the CSOs, ta-
ble 9 gives the underlying patterns for all descriptive information. In accordance with 
the above findings, three dimensions are extracted, which yield, together with the inde-
pendent feature of InclusionEfforts a four dimensional pattern underlying the CSOs. 
The main message is that there is very little in terms of causality or co-occurrence 
among properties and activities. Given this pattern, one needs four different pieces of 
information to describe the CSOs in an encompassing manner: Are there members? 
What resources does the CSO have for its work? Does it abide to some form of external 
control in order to assure "good governance", and last, does it engage in inclusion ef-
forts? 
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Table 9: Overall Pattern Legitimacy and Activity of CSOs 
 Dimension 
Variable Involvement Transparency Activity 
Member 0,85 0,11 -0,15 
MemberRoleIndex 0,70 0,24 0,12 
MemberCommunication 0,81 -0,13 -0,07 
MemberInfluence 0,53 0,02 -0,32 
MemberContact 0,85 -0,11 -0,15 
InformationTransmission 0,68 -0,02 0,09 
Mobilizing 0,67 -0,29 -0,04 
CSORoles 0,52 0,03 0,12 
CSOInstruments 0,36 -0,25 0,59 
CSOResources 0,25 0,14 0,63 
Transp. Organizational 0,33 0,50 -0,19 
Transp. Financial 0,04 0,46 0,10 
ExternalControl 0,00 0,73 0,09 
InclusionEfforts 0,04 0,04 -0,13 
Eigenvalue 4,35 1,28 1,01 
Remark: N=60. Unrotated Factor Scores 
These four pieces of information are independent, i.e. for instance, resource endowment 
is not related to whether the CSO has members or not. This indicates among other 
things, that representativity, or a broad member base, are of limited use for the CSOs’ 
work. If a CSO has members, a set of tasks arises, but these tasks are directly related to 
managing the relations to members and hence do not fundamentally affect the CSO’s 
relations to IOs. 
Nor is there a pattern in the sense that CSOs which are more legitimate in one di-
mension are also more legitimate in another one. Notably, the involvement of members 
does not make the CSO to strive for more legitimacy in other aspects, such as inclusion 
or transparency. Inclusion efforts stand out as a feature which is strikingly independent 
from the other features.  
For illustrative purposes, figures 1 and 2 give the location of the 60 CSOs in terms of 
where they are located in the property space, allowing statements about whether there 
are recognizable clusters of similar CSOs. 
Figure 1 gives an overview on the legitimacy of the CSOs, when looking at the par-
ticipation of members and the transparency. Overall legitimacy increases from the bot-
tom left to the top right quadrant of figure 1. In the low legitimacy corner, we find in 
particular the "institutes" or think tanks acting like consultants. These organizations are 
not transparent about where much of their funding comes from, what they do and which 
are, most of all, free floating in that they are not connected in any way, direct or indi-
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rect, with citizens. Note that they still can engage in inclusion efforts, i.e. reconnect with 
those who are concerned by their work.  
Figure 1: CSO Legitimacy - Transparency and Involvement of Members 
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In the right bottom corner, we find the majority of member CSOs. They are connected 
with citizens, either by having individuals as members or by having organizations as 
members, which in turn have individuals as members. The actual involvement of mem-
bers differs substantially, they scatter broadly along the horizontal dimension. In terms 
of transparency, member CSOs are on average similar to non-member, "consultancy" 
CSOs, and both groups remain substantially below the level of transparency which is 
possible, indicated by Germanwatch and ActionAid. Interestingly, there are member 
CSOs, which are even less transparent than consultancy CSOs, e.g. Pax Christi. 
In terms of activity, CSOs cover the full range. The least active CSO is CONGO, itself a 
network which is more or less limited to providing organizational infrastructure to 
member CSOs, the other extreme is the WWF.  
There is no overall pattern in the sense that CSOs with a better connection with citi-
zens are more active. The reason is that the resources (access to persons for lobbying, 
but also the potential to engage in and threaten with public events like demonstrations) 
matter most for activity and that the resources are not determined by membership. 
Membership affects the access to the public, but that is only one resource among sev-
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eral. Membership per se is neither a decisive resource nor a decisive driver for CSO 
activity.  
Figure 2: CSO Activity and Involvement of Members  
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In section 2 above, we argued that there could be empirically and should be normatively 
certain patterns linking features of the CSOs to the theme they are covering. To test 
these expectations, the next aspect we want to analyze is the following: Are there group-
ings of the CSOs by their member structure, the policy field in which they are active, or 
by the IOs they are affiliated with, i.e. do issue characteristics (trade or peace keeping) 
engender similar structures in the CSOs that engage in advocacy in this domain? 
Are the CSOs affiliated with a certain IO more similar to CSOs also covering this 
particular IO? For instance, one might presume that CSOs active in the field of peace 
and conflict, or in the field of trade, are more similar to each other. Figure 3 gives the 
main legitimacy indicators - transparency and connection with citizens - for various 
CSOs, which in figure 3 are labeled by the IO they are tracking. As can be seen, there is 
no clustering in the sense that a certain IO is covered by a “typical” CSO in the sense 
that the CSOs covering it have certain characteristic features. The only bias arises from 
the fact that in the European Security and Defense Policy the sample (not necessarily 
the population) is dominated by consultancy CSOs, like International Alert or Interna-
tional Crisis Group.  
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Figure 3: CSO Properties by IO Affiliation 
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IO affiliation does not necessarily indicate the CSO's policy field of origin, which might 
be more relevant for the properties of the CSO. As we argued in section 2, one might 
suspect that CSOs in a certain policy domain are more similar to each other. To test this 
suggestion, figure 4 below indicates the similarity of CSOs based on their policy field of 
origin. 
Just as with IO affiliations, there is no consistent and recognizable pattern based on 
the policy fields in the sense that CSOs from a certain field share certain features and 
cluster. At least for the available sample, the CSOs' original policy field does not leave 
an "organizational mark" on the CSOs which would allow to differentiate clusters of 
similar CSOs. It is not the case that CSOs which originate for instance in the domain of 
environmental policy share certain features. Again, there is no pattern, indicating that 
the CSOs' organizational features are caused by factors, which are not covered by our 
data.  
Applying Lowi’s "policy determines politics" dictum, one might speculate that 
themes which are highly "public" and concern many, such as environmental protection, 
are characterized by CSOs which have (individual) members, while low profile themes 
such as trade and conflict prevention are covered by consultancy CSOs. 
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Figure 4: CSO Properties by Policy Field of Origin 
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Are there systematic patterns in the sense that CSOs with individuals as members differ 
from other CSOs, which are less connected with citizens (by being organizations of or-
ganizations) or which do not have any members at all?  
Figure 5 gives the scatter of member involvement and transparency, indicating the 
type of membership that CSOs have: A indicates that the CSO does not have members, 
B indicates that individuals are members, C that organizations are members and D indi-
cates hybrid organizations in which both, individuals and organizations, are members of 
the CSO.  
The left hand cluster is constituted by the “memberless” consultancy CSOs, some 
which are service providers for IOs, the exemption being the Quakers UN Office, 
QUNO, which has individual members, but does not give them a role. The right hand 
cluster encompasses membership-CSOs, and as can be seen, they do not systematically 
differ by type in transparency or member involvement. Notably, there are no clusters 
separating the individuals as member or organizations as members CSOs. As was ar-
gued in section 1 above, one could have expected that member involvement is higher if 
the organizations are members, because here the smaller number of members together 
with their higher resources reduces the collective action problem of controlling the or-
ganization. 
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Figure 5: CSO Legitimacy by Type of Membership  
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4.5. Properties of CSOs as a Factor for Activities 
Next, we want to study in more detail whether there is a linkage between a CSO's prop-
erties and its activities. Do certain properties of the CSO, notable resources, affect the 
way it behaves vis-à-vis the IO? Do certain CSOs, for instance, those with a closer con-
nection to members, differ in their roles? While we studied the multiplicity of the roles 
above, we now want to ask, whether certain roles are more likely for CSOs with certain 
properties - how do CSOs perceive themselves? Is this a result of how the CSO is or-
ganized or is it dependent on the issue area? To do so, we compared properties and ac-
tivities of CSOs for different policy fields and the different IOs which the CSOs are 
covering (which are covered by CSOs) . 
4.5.1. Availability of Instruments and Resources 
While we would presume that resources are an important factor in the CSOs' advocacy 
work, we have no information about what determines the endowment with resources. 
The factor analysis shows that the only meaningful correlation occurs between the ac-
tivities and the resources, which however, only implies that more resources allow for 
more activities. Table 10 compares member CSOs and consultancies in terms of re-
sources and instruments available for influencing IOs.  
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Table 10: Instruments and Resources for Advocacy 
 Member CSOs Consultancies 
Instruments %Yes %Yes 
Public Protest 34,8 0 
Press Releases  69,6 50,0 
Policy Papers 76,1 78,6 
Direct Relations & Lobbying 78,2 71,4 
Participation Consultation 67,4 57,1 
Number of Instruments 3,26 2,57 
   
Resources   
Provide Information 82,6 85,7 
Moral Arguments 39,1 50,0 
Representing Population 39,1 0,0 
Provide Services 15,2 42,9 
Contacts 56,5 42,9 
Threat Potential 34,8 7,1 
Number of Resources 2,67 2,29 
 
Member and consultancy CSOs only differ in that the former recur also to public pro-
tests and tend to use press releases more often, both of which are resources arising di-
rectly from the fact that having members creates a higher publicity in the society with 
each member acting as a multiplier for the CSO. This is not a substitute, but an addi-
tional instrument, which they have at hand. Threat potential is based on publicity, either 
in form of organizing public protests or in addressing the media, cf. the section on me-
dia presence below.  
Consultancies never recur to public protests as an instrument and never argue that 
they should be heard because they represent large shares of the population. And, apart 
from one case, they not perceive themselves to have any or use threat potential. Instead, 
they more often provide services. In the other instruments and resources, the two types 
of CSOS do not differ substantially. 
As for whether the CSOs are pro-active, there are no systematic differences between 
member and consultancy CSOs: Most are proactive and there are no noteworthy differ-
ences between policy field or the IO nor does the pro active role in any way correspond 
to resource endowment or the type of members the CSOs have. 
4.5.2. CSO's Roles  
Given that there is basically independence between resources, legitimacy, transparency, 
we now want to investigate in more detail into the roles the CSOs pursue in the setting 
of different IOs. We would presume that roles are determined by the members, but in 
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particular by the policy field and the theme the AdO is covering, i.e. by the IO affilia-
tion. In some policy fields and some IOs, it is simply not possible to be the counter-
weight to another interest group, because there is no other interest group pursing an op-
posite interest, for instance in the case of human rights promotion. 
Most CSOs have many roles: the majority of CSOs in whatever policy field, in relation 
to whatever IO or of whatever membership type are fulfilling multiple roles, on average 
two, albeit there are also cases of CSOs stating that they are not fulfilling any of the 
four roles, but to be engaged in providing organizational infrastructure for other CSOs. 
Regarding (the) roles in the context of the IO, two IOs stand out: those CSOs tracking 
the EU Environmental Policy have on average the most roles, typically three, while 
those tracking the WTO have the fewest, typically only one or two. 
Table 11: Roles of CSOs by Policy Field and IO. 
Counter- 
part 
Project  
Partner 
Information 
Provider 
Counter- 
weight 
  
Yes 
%  
Yes Yes 
%  
Yes Yes 
%  
Yes Yes 
%  
Yes 
Total 
CSO 
Roles by Policy Field 
Environment 5 55,6 6 66,7 7 77,8 7 77,8 9 
Human rights 10 62,5 8 50,0 9 56,3 9 56,3 16 
Peace 5 55,6 6 66,7 7 77,8 3 33,3 9 
Trade 16 61,5 8 30,8 18 69,2 14 53,8 26 
Roles by IO Affiliation 
ESDP 5 55,6 6 66,7 7 77,8 3 33,3 9 
EU Environment 4 100,0 3 75,0 3 75,0 3 75,0 4 
EU External Trade 6 75,0 3 37,5 7 87,5 5 62,5 8 
EU Migration 7 87,5 4 50,0 4 50,0 4 50,0 8 
IGF 2 66,7 2 66,7 1 33,3 1 33,3 3 
UNFCCC 1 20,0 3 60,0 4 80,0 4 80,0 5 
UNHCR 1 20,0 2 40,0 4 80,0 4 80,0 5 
WTO 10 55,6 5 27,8 11 61,1 9 50,0 18 
Roles by Member Type 
Consultancy 5 35,7 5 35,7 8 57,1 3 21,4 14 
Member CSO 31 67,4 23 50,0 33 71,7 30 65,2 46 
 
More specific findings confirm the expectations one would have a priori: in the policy 
field of trade, the role of being a partner in a project is less frequent than in domains 
where there is project work "on the ground“, i.e. environment, human rights and peace. 
Trade oriented CSOs are slightly more often a counterpart to the IO (also little surpris-
ing given the clear free trade mission of most trade IOs and the WTO in particular) and 
less often a counterweight to other interests present in this forum. In the domain of 
peace, few CSOs see themselves as a counterweight, simply, because there is no one 
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against peace, albeit some actors might advocate a different strategy or a lower level of 
effort. In environmental policy, most CSOs are both information provider and a coun-
terweight, a reflection of the conflict between industry and environmental groups.  
When differentiating the picture on the basis of the IOs covered by the CSOs, two IO 
sub-sectors stand out: the UN Climate and the UN Refugees sector are not seen by the 
CSOs covering them as a counterpart, a finding one could interpret as a indication that 
both are very much progressive along the lines of what the CSOs in this domain want. 
Contrasting cases are IOs which are dominated by actors that do not share the views of 
the CSOs in this domain, for instance the EU Migration and the EU External Trade, to a 
lesser degree also the WTO.  
As for the effect of membership, member CSOs pursue on average 2.5 roles, consul-
tancy CSOs only 1.5, reflecting the fact that consultancy CSOs are much more special-
ized in their function, usually as providers of information and services, and are not lob-
byists active to counteract other lobbyists. The differences are slight, and one cannot 
make a statement about whether this finding can be generalized for the universe of 
CSOs which circle around a certain IO.  
As for the question of whether certain roles are associated with the usage of certain 
instruments, only very few and weak patterns emerge: those CSOs, which see them-
selves also as a counterpart to the IO itself, engage less often in direct lobbying. Con-
trary to this, "partners" of the IO abstain from public protests as a means to exercise 
influence and use direct relations and lobbying much more often. The same is true for 
those who see themselves as a provider of information. Regarding the resources, there is 
no indication that certain roles are associated with certain resources.  
All of the CSOs sampled are highly connected with other CSOs or are themselves al-
ready the organizational incarnation of a network of CSOs, for instance the Climate 
Action Network, CAN. Among the reasons given is that being connected enables to 
follow more issues, to be present, indirectly, in many fora and coordinate advocacy ef-
forts, for instance in taking identical positions and thus creating a certain "consensus". 
4.5.3. Inclusion Efforts 
The occurrence of inclusion efforts follows no clear pattern, but what can we say if we 
look at the occurrence on the basis of the CSO's theme, i.e. the policy field and the IO it 
is covering? As argued in section 2, one would expect (on a normative basis) that in 
themes where the risk of not including the beneficiaries is highest, the CSOs acknowl-
edge this and react by increasing their inclusion efforts. The magnitude of negative con-
sequences is for instance high in themes which concern beneficiaries in Third World 
countries, where there is potentially a large gap in terms of preferences between the 
beneficiary and the CSO staff (due to wealth). The risk of "forgetting" beneficiaries is 
highest here, because of the lack of information and resources in the beneficiaries' coun-
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tries, where citizens may be neither informed about the treatment of “their problems” in 
an IO and, even if they are, do not have the resources to attend the discussions in the 
framework of the IO.  
In an issue area like trade, where most actors have immediate material stakes and 
typically a better resource endowment, efforts to include the beneficiaries are less nec-
essary, as most beneficiaries have the resources to present their case in negotiations. But 
again, there are also CSOs engaged in making trade "fairer", i.e. in obtaining advantages 
for developing countries. 
Table 12 gives the share of CSOs actively engaged in inclusion efforts for theme, IO 
and membership structure. While inclusion efforts among the CSOs tracking the policy 
field trade and the WTO are low, the inclusion efforts are lowest for those CSOs which 
originate in the policy field of peace. Only one in nine CSOs reports efforts to include 
those who are ultimately affected by activities of IOs the CSO is trying to influence. 
Even in the domain of human rights, where the connection with the ultimate beneficiar-
ies is highest, as these groups are more vulnerable, only half of the CSOs in the sample 
engage in active inclusion efforts.  
Table 12: Inclusion Efforts of CSOs by Policy Field and IO Affiliation 
Inclusion Efforts by IO Affiliation Yes % Yes Total CSO  
ESDP 1 11.1 9 
EU Environment 2 50.0 4 
EU External Trade 3 37.5 8 
EU Migration 4 50.0 8 
IGF 1 33.3 3 
UNFCCC 2 40.0 5 
UNHCR 3 60.0 5 
WTO 1 5.6 18 
 
Inclusion Efforts by Policy Field Yes % Yes Total CSO 
Environment 4 44.4 9 
Human rights 8 50.0 16 
Peace 1 11.1 9 
Trade 4 15.4 26 
 
Inclusion Efforts by Membership Yes % Yes Total CSO 
No Members (Consultancies) 4 0.29 14 
Individuals 3 0.27 11 
Organizations 8 0.28 29 
Organizations & Individuals 2 0.33 6 
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As for the member structure, the two CSO types do not differ in their inclusion efforts. 
Notably, it is not the case that consultancy CSOs, which are less connected with citi-
zens, compensate for this by engaging more in inclusion. Given that inclusion efforts 
referred to include beneficiaries in the internal decision-making, and given the fact that 
in consultancies there is no decision-making in its sense comparable to member CSOs, 
the consultancies may use other means to obtain information about the preferences of 
their beneficiaries. 
5. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
In this paper we studied the degree to which a range of diverse CSOs fulfill certain cri-
teria of legitimacy, and how this relates to their work, in particular their resources, in-
struments and activities available when dealing with IOs. We also tested for systematic 
patterns between legitimacy, member structure and policy field of the CSO. What is 
striking in the results is the large variation and, moreover, the lack of certain patterns 
one would expect. Notably, it is not the case that CSOs from a certain policy domain are 
characterized by shared features, neither in legitimacy nor in their dealings with the IO. 
We take this to be an indication that the task of advocacy in the setting of an IO is large-
ly functionally similar across all themes (thus no similarities based on IO affiliation) 
and that the CSOs have organizational traditions (thus large variation between the CSOs 
in terms of roles and strategies). 
One might argue that if a CSO acknowledges the need for legitimacy, it would en-
gage in assuring that certain common criteria of legitimacy are met throughout. While 
the legitimacy criteria enumerated by Steffek and Nanz (2008) are derived from a cer-
tain normative view, they are neither far-fetched nor impractical. However, the overall 
finding is that the CSOs sampled show low levels of legitimation according to these 
standards, typically remaining way below what is possible and what at least some CSOs 
achieve. Only few CSOs can be seen as a benchmark in that they have installed institu-
tional features which assure high levels of legitimacy. Having members is no guarantee 
that other criteria of legitimacy are achieved. For instance, even if members are in-
volved in setting the general course of a CSO, this does not imply that other legitimacy 
criteria are met more often. CSOs without members are not more often engaging the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their work. Some CSOs engage in inclusion efforts, others do 
not, and there is no systematic pattern.  
The qualitative information obtained in the interviews suggests that even these re-
sults may overstate the level of legitimacy: there is a notable gap between the CSO, 
which may be controlled by members, and the AdO, in that all interviewed AdO staff 
reported to have a substantial leeway in what aims to pursue and how to act. Even when 
taking a formally binding connection (e.g. voting) between CSO and citizens into ac-
count, one has to keep in mind that the distribution of factual power is lopsided in favor 
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of the CSO's administration, which may propose candidates and, in some cases, also 
"encourages" the election of certain candidates at the national level, for reasons of mi-
nority involvement.  
Transparency of most CSOs according to the criteria we apply is low. Taking a more 
qualitative and in detail look at transparency reveals that a good number of CSOs are 
not as open as it may seem at first glance, writing a great deal about the importance of 
transparency and their commitment to good practices, yet without giving the public 
clear information about their performance. On the other hand, some CSOs are out-
standing in terms of transparency by giving detailed financial reports, which are also 
audited on a regular basis.  
As for the differences between member and non-member CSOs ("Consultancies") in 
their activities, they are limited: member-CSOs have the option to launch public protests 
and to build up public pressure. This can work because many of them, like Greenpeace 
and Amnesty International, are household-names, while some consultancy CSOs, like 
International Alert, are not known to the wider public. Consultancy CSOs rely to a 
stronger degree on providing services and information to the IO.  
As for their role of providing the public with information about what is going on in 
IOs and international governance, member-CSOs have presumably advantages over 
media as far as the access to information and the ability to translate this information in 
consequences for citizens is concerned. For this reason, they could play an important 
role as transmitters of information. But the member CSOs in our sample are not provid-
ing more information to the public than others, nor do they function particularly well as 
transmitters of information from citizens (or at least from their members) up to the IO 
level.  
Thus, while the quantitative data indicates that the legitimacy of the CSOs in our 
sample as measured by objective criteria is problematic, this result is in a striking con-
tradiction with a finding in the qualitative sections of the survey about the CSO staff's 
self-assessment: they themselves perceive themselves to be fully legitimate in influenc-
ing policy decisions that affect a very large set of people. The legitimacy of their or-
ganization, it appeared, does not rank highly on the agenda of the CSO staff inter-
viewed. A good number of interview transcripts show that the very question regarding 
the CSO's legitimacy triggered a process in which legitimizing facts and narratives were 
made up. Regarding the existence of a potential gap between the CSO's policy demands 
and the ultimate beneficiaries' preferences, the interviews were enlightening. Some in-
terviewees stated that, albeit they are never in direct contact with the ultimate benefici-
aries of their efforts, they are clearly working on their behalf because that is what their 
CSO is all about. As one interviewee put it: "I don’t understand the question. X cam-
paigns for the rights of the disenfranchised, oppressed and disempowered throughout 
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the world." As for the issue of being accountable to the public, one interviewee from a 
more radical CSO explained that the very point of his CSO is that it is not elected and 
not accountable to anyone. Another interviewee stated equally clearly: "We don’t speak 
for anybody. That is something that we are very clear about. We don’t pretend to repre-
sent anybody." 
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